We examine the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement on analyst affiliation bias in stock recommendations. Using a comprehensive measure of investment bank-firm relationships, including equity and debt underwriting and M&A advising, we find that analyst affiliation bias is substantially reduced for analysts employed by the investment banks named in the settlement. However, for analysts employed by other large investment banks, we find strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias both before and after the Global Settlement. The results hold after controlling for shifts in the recommendation schemes used by investment banks and are robust to alternative empirical specifications. Our results suggest that the Global Settlement was successful in mitigating affiliation bias, but only for the investment banks named in the settlement.
Administrators Association and 12 of the largest investment banks was to reduce the conflicts of interest arising between the investment banking and research departments within the major banks.
1 Subsequent research suggests that investment banks changed their behavior following the Global Settlement 2 , but does not distinguish between analysts employed by sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks and provides little evidence on affiliation beyond the well-studied equity underwriting relationship. In this study, we use a broad measure of investment banking relationships, including equity and debt underwriting and M&A advising, to examine the impact of the Global Settlement on analyst affiliation bias for a large sample of sanctioned and non-sanctioned investment banks (IBs).
Sell-side financial analysts provide buy/sell recommendations and earnings forecasts for a set of covered firms. In general, analysts are compensated and earn a reputation based on the quality of the information they provide. Despite these incentives to produce accurate information, however, analysts can also face pressure to issue optimistic or biased coverage. In particular, the financial services firms that employ analysts also compete for lucrative underwriting and M&A advisory mandates and may seek to 2 use biased coverage as one means of winning over potential clients. As a result, analysts face a conflict between their role in providing quality information to financial markets (and the associated reputational concerns) and the motivations of their employers to win future investment banking business.
Following previous research, we define an affiliated analyst as one who is employed by a financial services firm that also has an investment banking relationship with the covered firm. Existing research suggests that affiliated analysts tend to produce optimistic (upward biased) recommendations and earnings forecasts relative to unaffiliated analysts (see, for example, Dugar and Nathan 1995, Lin and McNichols 1998) . This research focuses primarily on affiliation through equity underwriting relationships, with a particular emphasis on affiliation at the time of an equity issue. 3 However, equity underwriting is only one of many services that investment banks provide to firms. In the fourth quarter of 2013, for example, equity underwriting accounted for only 36% of total investment banking revenues at Goldman Sachs, compared to 34% for financial advising and 30% for debt underwriting. In their analysis of relationships between firms and investment banks, Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) show that the tendency of firms to use a particular investment bank in multiple functional areas has increased significantly over time, particularly when the bank also lends to the firm. In addition, they find an increase in the number of investment banks that a firm chooses to work with. These patterns suggest that investment banking relationships may have an impact beyond that evidenced through equity underwriting and the impact of these relationships may vary through time.
To better understand the impact of investment banking relationships on analyst behavior, we examine the individual equity, debt, and M&A components of the relationship, as well as the overall investment banking relationship. We expect the results to be strongest for the overall relationship for two reasons. First, we expect investment banking relationships that span multiple functional areas to put more pressure on analysts than narrow relationships. Second, we note that equity, debt, and M&A transactions are discrete observations of an ongoing relationship. As a result, viewing all of these transactions together 3 allows us to observe the relationship at more points in time, better capturing the ongoing nature of the relationships.
To analyze analyst affiliation bias, we start with the sample of U.S. non-financial firms that have at least one class of common stock listed on a major U.S. exchange between 1996 and 2009. For this sample of firms, we then collect detailed data on all equity issues, debt issues, and M&A transactions,
including transaction values and the identification of all underwriters and M&A advisors. To reduce the sample of investment banks considered, we rank all banks annually in each of the three transaction categories and restrict the sample to those banks with an average ranking in the top 25 in at least one category. The resulting sample includes 48 investment banks at the beginning of the sample period and 28
at the end of the sample period. Finally, using I/B/E/S data, we identify all analysts employed by one of these sample banks and restrict the sample of analyst recommendations to those stocks covered by one of these analysts.
Our main variable of interest is the analyst's relative recommendation, defined as the difference between the analyst recommendation (with strong buy=5 and strong sell=1) and the median recommendation across all analysts covering the stock. Following Ljungqvist et al. (2007) , we construct this variable at the end of each quarter, using the most recent recommendation by each analyst during the preceding twelve months. In our main tests, we regress this variable on proxies for investment banking relationships and a set of control variables shown in prior literature to have an association with analyst recommendations. Our primary relationship variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm hired the investment bank as a lead or co-manager on an equity or debt deal or as an advisor on an M&A transaction during the prior three years. However, we also provide tests using a continuous measure of relationships, defined as the proportion of a firm's total transaction value for which the investment bank acted as a lead manager, co-manager, or advisor. We define these relationship variables separately for equity, debt, and M&A transactions, as well as for the combined set of transactions across all types.
Consistent with prior research, we find strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias prior to the 4 Global Settlement in 2003. For banks named in the Global Settlement (GS banks), this bias is evident for all individual transaction types and for the overall relationship measure. For non-GS banks in the period prior to the Global Settlement, we find mixed evidence of an affiliation bias based on individual transaction type relationship measures, but strong evidence of an affiliation bias based on the overall relationship measure. This evidence confirms our prediction that the overall measure better captures the ongoing nature of the investment banking relationship. The more striking results appear during the period following the Global Settlement. During this period, there is weak evidence of an affiliation bias for GS banks, but this effect is substantially reduced from the pre-Global Settlement effect. In contrast, non-GS banks continue to exhibit strong analyst affiliation bias even after the Global Settlement. This bias is evident across all types of transactions and for the overall relationship measure. These results suggest that while the Global Settlement was successful at eliminating analyst affiliation bias for the banks named in the settlement, conflicts of interest appear to persist for other investment banks.
Our results are robust to several alternative specifications and robustness checks. While our main results are based on relationship indicator variables, we find similar results based on continuous measures of relationships. The results are also robust to alternative fixed effects specifications, including firm, analyst, and investment bank fixed effects. Most importantly, our results are not driven by the shift of many investment banks from a five-tier to a three-tier recommendation scheme following the Global Settlement (Kadan et al. 2009 ). We find similar results when we repeat our analysis on a relative recommendation variable based on a three-tier recommendation scheme.
As an alternative specification, we use logistic regressions to examine the impact of investment banking relationships on the likelihood of issuing a buy or strong buy and the likelihood of issuing a sell or strong sell. Consistent with the relative recommendation results, this analysis suggests that prior to the Global Settlement, both GS and non-GS banks were significantly more likely to issue a buy or strong buy recommendation and significantly less likely to issue a sell or strong sell recommendation when affiliated with the firm through an investment banking relationship. After the Global Settlement, the bias for GS 5 banks is reduced, but remains significant. For non-GS banks, the bias is significant both before and after the Global Settlement, with some evidence that it increases in magnitude in the post period. For both groups of banks, the logit results suggest that a significant affiliation bias remains following the Global Settlement, with the effect being substantially larger for non-GS banks.
Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) find that the importance of firm-wide investment banking relationships is tied to the lending services offered by the bank. As a final test, we examine whether incorporating lending data has an impact on the measurement of analyst affiliation bias. We find only weak evidence that lending relationships have an incremental effect on the measurement of analyst affiliation bias. Thus, affiliation bias appears to be best captured through the equity, debt, and M&A relationships.
In summary, our results suggest that the Global Settlement was successful in reducing the analyst affiliation bias in recommendations from banks named in the Global Settlement. However, for large banks not named in the Global Settlement, we find strong evidence of a continued affiliation bias in the postsettlement period. Our findings suggest that conflicts of interest between investment banking and analyst roles within investment banks have not been completely eliminated by the Global Settlement. We also
show that an overall measure, incorporating equity underwriting, debt underwriting, and M&A advising, is better able to capture investment banking relationships and their effects than measures based on any one type of transaction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature related to analyst affiliation bias and provides background information on the Global Settlement. In Section 3, we describe our data and sample construction. Section 4 presents our main results related to analyst affiliation bias and Section 5 examines the incremental impact of lending relationships. Section 6 concludes.
BACKGROUND

Analyst Affiliation Bias
Sell-side financial analysts have been widely studied as proxies for the market's expectations. At 6 the same time, however, analysts' recommendations, target prices, and forecasts have been shown to be optimistic (Beneish 1991; Bradshaw 2004; La Porta 1996) . In particular, prior research provides strong evidence of a link between analyst optimism (or bias) and investment banking relationships between covered firms and the banks that employ analysts. Dugar and Nathan (1995) Prior studies also point to factors that appear to mitigate analyst affiliation bias. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) find that the bias is lower for bulge bracket investment banks than for lower-tier banks, suggesting that the reputational concerns of bulge bracket banks outweigh the benefits of biased analyst coverage. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) argue that, because analysts rely on institutional investors for trading commissions and ratings, they will be less likely to produce biased coverage on affiliated stocks that are also highly visible to institutional investors. Their results confirm that relative recommendations are negatively related to the presence of institutional investors.
Other research examines the post-recommendation performance of covered firms. Michaely and Womack (1999) report that in the month following the post-IPO quiet period, affiliated analysts issue more buy recommendations for the IPO firm than do unaffiliated analysts, and the IPOs recommended by affiliated analysts substantially under-perform IPOs recommended by unaffiliated analysts. Similarly, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) find that the "buy" and "strong buy" ratings of IB-employed analysts tend to underperform those of other analysts. (2014) distinguish between strategic and non-strategic distortions in analyst behavior, with strategic analysts expected to issue upward-biased recommendations but less optimistic forecasts. Using data from 1994 through 2008, they show that affiliated analysts indeed tend to issue more positive recommendations, but similar or more negative forecasts, than unaffiliated analysts. 6 We contribute to this literature by examining the differential impact of the Global Settlement on analyst affiliation bias for sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks.
Data and Sample Characteristics
To construct our sample, we use two main data sources. First, we use SDC to identify all equity, debt, and M&A activity by a large sample of U.S. firms, allowing us to measure the relationships between firms and their investment banks. Second, we use I/B/E/S data to identify the stock recommendations of sell-side analysts and the brokerage firms for which the analysts work. Together, these two datasets allow us to provide a detailed examination of the link between analyst recommendations and investment banking relationships both before and after the Global Settlement.
Sample Firms and Investment Banking Activity
We begin with the sample of all U.S. firms with listed common stock on any dates between 1996
and 2009 (CRSP share codes 10 or 11). We identify CRSP firms based on the permanent company number (PERMCO), and we eliminate financials, utilities, and government agencies. The resulting sample includes 8,322 firms. For this sample of firms, we then use the Securities Data Company (SDC) database to collect information on all public and private issues of equity and debt by the firm and any M&A transactions in which the firm is either the acquirer or the target. 7 To provide meaningful analysis of investment banking relationships, we exclude transactions for which either the transaction value or the identity of the underwriter/advisor is missing.
To identify affiliation through investment banking relationships, we focus on the most important investment banks in the sample. To identify these banks, we begin with the full sample of banks identified as lead or co-managing underwriters in the equity and debt sample or as advisors in the M&A transaction sample. 8 We then compute market share ranks on an annual basis for each transaction type (equity, debt, and M&A). Finally, we compute each bank's average market share rank in each transaction type category across all years during which the bank appears in the sample. We limit our attention to those investment banks with an average market share rank of 25 or higher in at least one transaction type category. In cases where one of the top 25 banks reflects the merger of two or more predecessor banks, all predecessor banks are also included. As shown in Table A2 in the Appendix, the resulting sample includes 57
7 Firms are matched between the two databases using the PERMCO from CRSP and the CIDGEN number from SDC. See Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) for a detailed description of the matching of firms between CRSP and SDC. 8 Investment bank names are cleaned to eliminate multiple variations of the same investment bank name and to adjust for mergers and acquisitions among investment banks.
11 different investment bank names during the sample period, with 48 active at the beginning of the sample period and 28 active at the end of the sample period. 
Analyst Recommendations
To test analyst affiliation bias, we focus on analyst stock recommendations, one of the analysts' primary and most visible outputs. We collect recommendations data, including the identity of the broker employing the analyst, from I/B/E/S. We then link the recommendations to the sample of CRSP firms using CUSIPs and hand-match the broker names in I/B/E/S to the sample investment banks using the I/B/E/S broker translation file.
Following Ljungqvist et al. (2007) we examine recommendations at a quarterly frequency. For each calendar quarter end and each firm in our sample, we select the most recent recommendation issued during the preceding 12 months by each analyst covering the stock. We code recommendations as 1 (strong sell) through 5 (strong buy). We then define each analyst's relative recommendation, RELREC, by subtracting the consensus (i.e., median) recommendation across all analysts covering the firm in the same one-year window. 10 Finally, we focus our analysis on the relative recommendations of those analysts employed by one of the sample investment banks identified above and we limit our sample of stocks to those covered by at least one analyst employed by a sample investment bank. The resulting sample includes 216,242 quarterly observations, involving 4,628 analysts and 5,111 sample stocks.
Variable Construction and Sample Characteristics
Our main empirical tests examine the relation between the relative recommendations of analysts (RELREC) and investment banking relationships between the analyst's firm and the covered stock, after controlling for firm, analyst, and investment bank characteristics that have been shown in prior literature to affect recommendations. Our empirical model closely follows that in Ljungqvist et al. (2007) , with several important differences. First, we examine investment banking relationships across a wider set of transaction types, including equity, debt, and M&A transactions. Second, we define relationships both within specific functional areas and across all functional areas. Finally, we examine affiliation bias both before and after the Global Settlement, allowing for differences between investment banks named in the Global Settlement and other banks.
Summary statistics for our sample of quarterly observations are provided in Table 1 . Consistent with previous research, we find that analysts primarily issue "buy" or "strong buy" recommendations, giving a mean (median) analyst recommendation across our sample of 3.6 (4.0). As noted earlier, our main variable of interest is the relative recommendation of the analyst (RELREC), defined as the difference between the analyst's recommendation and the consensus (i.e., median) recommendation across all analysts following the stock. 11 RELREC has a range from -4 to +3, with a mean (median) of 0.0025 (0.0000) across our sample observations.
To proxy for investment banking relationships, we measure at each quarter end date the proportion of a firm's equity, debt, and M&A transaction value during the preceding 36 months for which each investment bank acted as lead underwriter, co-managing underwriter, or adviser (IBRel). While we provide some tests based on this continuous relationship measure, the majority of our tests are based on relationship dummy variables (IBRelD) that equal one if the investment bank worked with the firm on a transaction during the previous 36 months and zero otherwise.
We define relationships both by transaction type and across all transaction types (overall relationship). 12 We expect affiliation bias to be better captured by overall relationships than by typespecific relationships for two reasons. First, we expect any pressure placed on the analyst to be magnified when the investment banking relationship spans multiple functional areas. Second, because equity, debt, and M&A transactions are discrete measures of what is likely a ongoing relationship, we expect the use of 13 multiple transaction types to better capture any underlying relationship.
To illustrate this last point, Figure 1 Settlement and other non-sanctioned banks. Based on this categorization, 57% of our quarterly observations are from GS banks and 43% from Non-GS banks. Appendix Table A2 lists the set of sample investment banks falling into each category.
We define six analyst-level characteristics. Four of these variables are defined directly from the I/B/E/S recommendations data. Seniority is the number of years since the analyst first appeared in I/B/E/S and Seasoning is the number of years since the analyst initiated coverage on the particular stock. NFollow is the number of firms followed by the analyst during the quarter and JobMove is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst changed employers during the quarter. Following Hong and Kubik (2003) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007), we define relative forecast accuracy (RelAccuracy) based on the analyst's average earnings forecast accuracy across all followed stocks. 14 Finally, AllStar is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst is a ranked as an All-Star by Institutional Investor magazine during year t-1, and 0 otherwise. The mean (median) observation in our sample has seniority of 5.4 (4.9) years, seasoning of 2.3 (1.4) years, and 11 (10) followed stocks. The mean and median values of relative accuracy are 41.23% and 40.96%, respectively. Finally, 18.9% of the recommendation observations in our sample are issued by All-Star analysts and 3.2% by analysts that changed employers during the quarter.
Our last set of control variables is related to firm characteristics. ANF is the number of analysts issuing recommendations for the firm during the previous 12 months, based on I/B/E/S recommendations.
MV is the market value of equity at the end of the prior calendar year, as defined by CRSP. InstHoldings is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the end of the quarter, based on Thomson Reuters 13F filings. Lastly, Proceeds is the total value of transaction by the firm during the previous 36 14 For each analyst following each firm, we first estimate the absolute value of the difference between the analyst's most recent forecast of fiscal-year earnings and actual earnings, scaled by prior year price. We then rescale such that the most accurate analyst following the firm scores 1 and the least accurate analyst scores 0. Finally, each analyst's relative forecast accuracy is defined as their mean score across all stocks followed over years t-2 through t. See Appendix Table A1 for a more complete description.
15 months, defined for each transaction type (equity, debt, or M&A) and across all transaction types (overall). The mean (median) observation in our sample has analyst following of 11 (10), market capitalization of $9.6 ($1.9) billion, and institutional holdings of 62% (70%). Three-year proceeds average $77 million, $428 million, and $1,055 million for equity, debt, and M&A, respectively. Across quarterly observations with positive proceeds, these averages increase to $300 million, $1,145 million, and $2,981 million.
To highlight the relation between investment banking relationships and analyst recommendations, Figure 2 suggest that analyst affiliation bias may persist following the Global Settlement.
However, these frequencies do not control for other factors that may affect analyst recommendations. In the next section, we therefore analyze analyst recommendations in a multivariate framework.
Results
In this section, we describe our main results related to analyst affiliation bias. Using the quarterly data described above, we estimate variations of the following general model specification:
where IBRelD jkt indicates an investment banking relationship between investment bank j and firm k during the 36 months ending in quarter t, and the remaining variables represent controls for analyst, investment bank, and stock characteristics. Our main tests are based on a comparison of the relationship interaction terms involving IB_GS and IB_NonGS, which are dummy variables that distinguish between investment banks that were sanctioned in the Global Settlement and those that were not. To examine the impact of the Global Settlement on analyst affiliation bias, we provide two sets of analysis. In the full period analysis, we interact the relationship variables with a dummy variable equal to one for all quarters after the Global Settlement and zero otherwise. We also provide separate analyses for the sub-periods from 1998-2001 and 2003-2009. 15 Our general specifications also include year and firm fixed effects.
Relative Recommendations and Investment Banking Relationships
The full period regression results are presented in Table 2 . p-values based on robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients, where standard errors are clustered by firm. Examining the coefficients on the control variables, we see that relative recommendations are lower for large investment banks and for analysts that cover a large number of stocks, and higher for more experienced analysts and for stocks followed by a large number of analysts. Investment bank market share is positively related to relative recommendations for equity, M&A, and overall relationships, but negatively related for debt relationships. Consistent with expectations, the coefficient on the post-Global Settlement dummy variable indicates that relative recommendations dropped in the post period. There is also evidence that NonGlobal Settlement banks tend to have higher recommendations than GS banks, especially in the postGlobal Settlement period.
Turning to the results for investment banking relationships, we find strong evidence that both GS and Non-GS banks exhibited significant affiliation bias in the pre-Global Settlement period. This result holds for each type-specific relationship (equity, debt, and M&A), as well as for the overall investment banking relationship. However, the post-GS interaction terms point to significant differences between GS and Non-GS banks in the period following the Global Settlement. For GS banks, the interaction terms suggest that analyst affiliation bias is significantly reduced or even eliminated in the post-Global Settlement period. In particular, the combined post-Global Settlement effects listed at the bottom of the table show that analyst affiliation bias is insignificant in the post period for equity relationships, and marginally significant for debt and M&A relationships. The results for overall relationships point to statistically significant affiliation bias for GS banks in the period after the Global Settlement, but the magnitude of the effect is substantially reduced from the pre period.
The results for non-GS banks provide a sharp contrast. For these investment banks, analyst affiliation bias is not reduced significantly in the period following the Global Settlement. The results provide strong evidence of a continued analyst affiliation bias in the period following the Global Settlement for non-GS banks, regardless of whether relationships are measured based on equity, debt, or M&A transactions, or across all transactions.
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To better understand the effects of analyst affiliation bias in the periods before and after the Global Settlement, we estimate models using two sub-periods: 1998-2001 and 2003-2009 . The results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 3 , respectively. As in Table 2 , the results for the first sub-period point to significant analyst affiliation bias for both GS and non-GS banks. For GS banks, the coefficient on IBRelD is positive and significant for all type-specific and overall relationships. For non-GS banks, the coefficient is positive for all three type-specific relationship measures, but is insignificant for equity and debt and marginally significant for M&A. However, the coefficient for non-GS banks is significantly positive for overall relationships. Equality of coefficients between GS and non-GS banks cannot be rejected for any of the relationships measures in the first sub-period.
The results for the second sub-period (Panel B) confirm the findings from Table 2 . For GS banks, the coefficient on IBRelD is positive but insignificant for equity relationships, positive and marginally significant for debt and M&A, and significantly positive for overall relationships. However, as in Table 2 , the impact of investment banking relationships on relative recommendations is substantially reduced for GS banks in the post-Global Settlement period. For non-GS banks, significant analyst affiliation bias remains in the post-Global Settlement period, regardless of the relationship measure used. Equality of coefficients between GS and non-GS banks is easily rejected in the second sub-period for equity (pvalue=0.002), M&A (0.014), and overall relationships (0.000), but cannot be rejected for debt relationships (0.145).
The results from Tables 2 and 3 suggest that overall investment banking relationships may better capture analyst affiliation bias than relationship measures based solely on equity, debt, or M&A transactions. As noted earlier, this may reflect that relationships spanning multiple functional areas put more pressure on analysts to produce optimistic recommendations or it may reflect that the overall measure better captures the underlying investment banking relationship. In unreported results, we examine whether any of the type-specific relationship measures have incremental explanatory power when included in the regression with the overall measure. In each case, the effects of type-specific 19 relationships are subsumed by the overall relationship measure. Given these results, we focus on overall investment banking relationships throughout the rest of the paper.
The specifications described in Tables 2 and 3 follow prior literature by including firm fixed effects. To examine the robustness of the results to this choice and to the specification of relationship measure, Table 4 reports results from alternative specifications incorporating analyst and investment bank fixed effects for both relationship indicators and continuous relationship measures. Results for the subperiods before and after the Global Settlement are provided in Panels A and B, respectively. The first column in each panel of Table 4 repeats the overall relationship specification from Table 3 . Comparing this specification to those based on alternative fixed effects and continuous relationship measures shows that the main results are robust to these alternative specifications. For both continuous and discrete measures of investment banking relationships, the results point to significant analyst affiliation bias in the first sub-period, regardless of specification. In the second sub-period, the results become somewhat weaker after incorporating investment bank fixed effects, but remain at least marginally significant, especially for non-GS banks. Interestingly, results for GS banks are statistically significant based on relationship dummy variables, but insignificant based on continuous relationship measures.
In unreported results, we estimated two other robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the basic model for the subsets of GS and non-GS banks. Second, we re-estimated the model for the subset of firms covered by at least one affiliated and one non-affiliated analyst. In all cases, the findings are consistent with the overall results reported above.
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 through 4 Tables 2 and 3 . In the first sub-period, there is strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias for GS banks based on all measures of relationships. For non-GS banks, there is weak evidence of analyst affiliation bias based on M&A and overall relationships, but insignificant results based on equity and debt relationships.
In the second sub-period, the impact of analyst affiliation is substantially reduced for GS banks, though it remains statistically significant for all measures of relationships. For non-GS banks in the post Global Settlement period, we again find strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias based on both transaction type relationship measures and overall relationships. Thus, our results are not driven by the shift of some investment banks from a 5-tier to a 3-tier recommendation scale.
Logit Models for Buy/Sell Recommendations
As an alternative test, we follow Kadan et al. (2009) Table 5 , the dependent variables in the logit models are defined based on a 3-tier recommendation scale and are therefore robust to a shift in recommendation scales by some investment banks. Second, the dependent variables in the logit model are defined directly from I/B/E/S recommendations and are therefore unaffected by the definition of "consensus" ranking used in the construction of RelRec. Table 6 presents the results from the logit models for both the full period and the pre/post Global Settlement sub-periods. Again, the findings point to significant analyst affiliation bias. In the models for buy/strong buy recommendations, the results suggest that both GS and non-GS banks are significantly more likely to issue buy or strong buy recommendations when affiliated with the covered firm through an investment banking relationship. For GS banks, this effect is strongest during the first sub-period, but remains statistically significant even after the Global Settlement. For non-GS banks, affiliation bias is statistically significant and similar in magnitude both before and after the Global Settlement.
The logit results for sell/strong sell recommendations point to symmetric effects in terms of pessimistic recommendations, although the results appear to be driven primarily by the period after the Global Settlement. Specifically, during the post-Global Settlement period, both GS and non-GS banks are less likely to issue sell or strong sell recommendations when affiliated with the firm through an investment banking relationship.
The results from the logit models are largely consistent with those based on relative recommendations and suggest that analysts tend to issue more optimistic (or less pessimistic)
recommendations on firms with which their employer has an investment banking relationship. 
The Impact of Lending Activity on Analyst Affiliation Bias
The results in Section 4 focus on investment banking relationships through equity, debt, and M&A transactions. As shown in Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) , lending can also have important effects on the relationships between firms and investment banks. 16 In this section, we examine whether lending relationships have any incremental impact on analyst affiliation bias, after controlling for other investment banking relationships.
To examine lending relationships, we use Dealscan data to collect the sample of syndicated loans involving our sample firms. For each loan, we identify the loan amount and all lenders identified as having lead arranger credit. Notably, the Dealscan data include both loans and revolving credit line agreements. We believe credit lines are an important part of a lending relationship, regardless of whether or not the loan is drawn down. However, the fact that these loans may not be drawn down suggests that the total loan values in Dealscan will not be comparable to the transaction values in the equity, debt, and M&A datasets.
To integrate the lending and investment banking datasets, we hand match lender names to our sample of large investment banks. Following the construction of the investment banking variables, we calculate investment bank market share, firm loan proceeds, and firm-lender relationships at the end of each quarter. For each investment bank in our sample, we calculate lending market share based on all loans over the prior twelve months. For each firm in our sample, we calculate lending proceeds as the sum of all loans received over the preceding 36 months. Finally, for each firm-investment bank pair, we calculate the lending relationship as the proportion of the firm's total loan value over the preceding 36 months for which the investment bank was assigned lead arranger credit and we calculate a revised "overall" relationship measure combining lending with equity, debt, and M&A transaction values.
Summary statistics for the lending variables are provided in Panel A of Table 7 . Across all quarterly observations in our sample, the lending relationship has a mean value of 2.82% and the overall relationship incorporating lending has a mean value of 5.84%. Investment bank market share has a mean (median) value of 4.56% (0.74%) based on lending alone and 4.58% (2.05%) based on the combined values of lending, equity, debt, and M&A transactions. The average value of three-year lending proceeds for the firms in our sample is $964.1 million across all observations and $1,818.3 million across observations with positive lending proceeds. In the third specification, we again include the overall relationship indicator based on combined equity, debt, and M&A transactions, but we add an interaction with the lending relationship indicator. The results from this specification suggest that the affiliation bias associated with investment banking relationships may be magnified in cases where there is also a lending relationship, especially during the first sub-period. Finally, in the fourth specification, we provide results based on the redefined overall relationship indicator that incorporates equity, debt, M&A, and lending transactions. This combined measure produces results that are similar to those from the overall relationship measure without lending, with affiliation bias being significant for non-GS banks in both sub-periods and strongest for GS banks in the first sub-period.
24
The results in Table 7 provide weak evidence that lending may lead to incremental affiliation bias effects beyond those captured by investment banking relationships, at least during the first sub-period.
However, unlike the main results based on equity, debt, and M&A relationships, the findings in Table 8 are sensitive to the inclusion of alternative fixed effects. In particular, when either analyst or investment bank fixed effects are included in these models, the incremental effects of lending become insignificant.
Thus, we conclude that the incremental impact of lending relationships on analyst affiliation bias are weak at best.
Conclusion
Previous research provides strong evidence of conflicts of interest between investment banking and research departments within large investment banks. In particular, research shows that analysts tend to issue optimistic recommendations on firms with which their employer has an equity underwriting Our data include all equity, debt, and M&A transactions by U.S. firms, allowing us to analyze a more comprehensive measure of investment banking relationships than has been studied in prior literature. In general, we find evidence of analyst affiliation bias for each individual type of investment banking relationship. However, our results suggest that an overall measure spanning all functional areas does a better job of capturing the investment banking relationship and the related affiliation bias. This finding is consistent with Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) , who find that the firm-wide component of investment banking relationships has increased in importance over time.
To better understand the impact of the Global Settlement on analyst behavior, we separate analysts employed by investment banks named in the Global Settlement (GS banks) and other top 25 investment banks (non-GS banks). Consistent with prior research, our results point to strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias for both groups of banks in the period prior to the Global Settlement. Following the Global Settlement affiliation bias is substantially reduced for those banks named in the Global Settlement. Thus, for the twelve GS banks, the settlement appears to have been largely successful at mitigating the conflict of interest between investment banking and analyst research. However, for other top investment banks, we find strong evidence of analyst affiliation bias even after the Global Settlement.
These findings suggest that the impact of the Global Settlement and the related regulatory changes was limited to the subset of sanctioned banks. The figure plots recommendation frequencies for our sample of quarterly data, where frequencies are classified on both a five-tier and a three-tier scale. Analysts are classified as being affiliated with either a Global Settlement bank or a non-Global Settlement bank and firm-analyst observations are separated into those that are associated with an investment bank relationship and those that are not, based on the overall investment banking relationship. 136,193 136,193 136,193 136,193 136,193 136,193 
